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Cosmopolitan Citizenship Education: Realistic Political Program or Program to Disillusioned 
Powerlessness? A Plea for a Critical Power Perspective within Global Citizenship Education 
 
- Citizen understood as both co-actor and rights-holder at the national level, and mostly as a limited rights-holder at 
the supranational and global stage 
- Do political educational programs overestimate the power of education in creating a global citizen (with no actual 
power)? 
- There is a lack of a critical power perspective on Global Citizenship Education. 
 
Purpose: The aim of the research is to determine to what extent one can talk about “cosmopolitan citizenship” not 
only programmatically, but also as an already functioning entity. And what role can and should civic education play in 
the development of such a citizenship? 
Methods: A working definition of citizenship at the national, supranational, and global level is developed with the help 
of political theory and European and international law.  
Several theses on the understanding of cosmopolitan citizenship in Global Citizenship Education and Education for 
Sustainable Development programs are discussed thanks to a policy analysis of, for example, UNESCO documents. 
Findings: Supranational programs and German curriculum-recommendations are mostly reduced to the level of rights-
holders and if “political action” is envisaged then it is mostly focused on its individual dimension of (private) social 
responsibility i.e. in its post-political dimension. This lacks analysis of global power conflicts and of the question of 
democratic participation on supranational policy regulation.   
Practical implications: There are implications for curriculum development and implementation of educational policy. 
 
Keywords: 
Cosmopolitan citizenship, EU, Council of Europe, UNESCO, power critique, policy implementation  
 
1 Introduction 
Debates on Global Citizenship Education (GCED) and 
Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) stress the 
importance of transnational engagement of civil society 
and the possibility of influencing global policies. One 
reason for a revival of the normative orientation to 
political cosmopolitanism1, as defended by authors such 
as Jürgen Habermas (2001), John Rawls (1999), Ulrich 
Beck (2006), Daniele Archibugi and David Held (1995) or 
Anthony McGrew (together with Held, 2000) among 
others, can be seen in the ongoing economic and social-
ecological crises and the crisis of democratic legitimacy in 
the European Union (EU) as well as in its member states. 
The cosmopolitan assumption that global problems can 
only be handled on a global scale (Beck, 2006), however, 
could also lead to misleading educational objectives. We 
will argue that there is no realistic perspective for a cos-
mopolitan democracy in order to deal with global crises 
like climate change, poverty, or migration. We experi-
ence only a very limited dimension of global citizenship 
as a "declarative" rights-holder or through a few (mostly 
professional) political actors such as international NGOs 
and transnational protest move-ments. This can lead to a 
deceptive experience of powerlessness among young 
people, because of the gap between the hope created by 
declarative models of cosmopolitan citizenship and the 
absence of political influence on global political issues. In 
this context, what should be the role and (potential) 
power of citizens in influencing politics at the suprana-
tional level, in a context where they experience power-
lessness (meaning the lack of democratic influence) and 
a subsequent democratic deficit affecting both political 
institutions and decision-making at the supranational 
level? 
In the first part of our paper, we will clarify our working 
definition of citizenship, distinguishing between two 
dimensions: citizens as political co-actors and citizens as 
rights-holders (i.e. citizenship in its democratic and in its 
liberal dimensions) (2). We will then analyse to what 
extent this model of citizenship (which has been deve-
loped at state level) can already be applied—not only 
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normatively-programmatically, but also de facto—to a 
supranational and global level (3). Considering this legal-
theoretical background, we will then turn to the edu-
cational context and its representations of citizenship. 
We will analyse, in which ways international, European, 
and German civic education documents address students 
as cosmopolitan citizens instead of (or in addition to) 
national (sub-national) and transnational citizens (4). We 
will show how these documents have primarily reduced 
citizens to the rights-holder dimension and if “political 
action” is envisaged, it is then in its individual dimension 
of sustainable “consumer citizens”, intercultural compe-
tencies and, (private) social engagement or voluntary 
service, that is in a post-political dimension. Moreover, 
these documents show a prejudicial absence of analysis 
from global power conflicts and exploitation of the global 
south in Citizenship Education (5). 
 
2 Definitional clarification: Citizens as political co-actors 
and rights-holders2 
A liberal-democratic citizenship encompasses a double 
dimension in which a citizen is both a political co-actor 
and a legal subject or rights-holder. According to the 
collective-democratic dimension, citizens, understood as 
co-actors, initiate, co-decide, and control collective poli-
tical actions. According to the liberal-individual dimen-
sion, a citizen, understood as a rights-holder, owns rights 
that he or she can defend individually before a court. 
In the liberal tradition, political action is to be 
understood as a consequence of the ownership of rights 
(Rawls, 1971). The rights-holder exists before they 
become a political co-actor. He or she owns these Rights 
by Nature (Locke) or by Reason (Kant, Rawls). In 
Habermas' interpretation there is a “co-originality” of the 
Rechtsstaat (constitutional state/rule of law) and popular 
sovereignty (Habermas, 1992, p. 117, 154 ff.), which, in 
our model, implies a co-originality of the liberal and 
democratic dimensions of citizenship. The “original” 
rights would be participation rights that allow for 
political action. But why should citizens be given a right 
to participate before they act politically? 
In accordance with the democratic idea (Rousseau, 
Maus 1999), on the contrary, citizens first fight politically 
to establish what rights they own because these rights 
are not given by God, by Nature or by Reason, but result 
from political struggles (Moulin-Doos, 2015, p. 83 ff.). 
Citizens are political co-actors and co-authors before 
they become the holders of the rights they fought for. 
Following Rousseau’s argument, it is not the natural 
rights that are defended after the social contract has 
been concluded (as is the case in Locke, 1989, 283-4 
§134), but the laws, which have been adopted by the 
citizens within the course of a legislative process 
(Rousseau, 1992, p. 80). The Rousseauan rights, which 
are decided upon by the Sovereign, are different from 
the Lockean pre-political rights. Even in an established 
constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) there is always the 
possibility of new rights or of a new interpretation of 
rights being fought for, of obsolete rights to be fought 
against (patriarchal rights for example), of political actors 
without participation rights, and of new forms of political 
engagement that may emerge in the course of political 
struggles (ib., p. 182 ff.). In this democratic (and not 
liberal) tradition, one must be a co-actor before one can 
become a rights-holder, in order to be part to its 
adoption and interpretation. According to the 
democratic idea, citizens create their rights or, following 
Rancière, their political stage (Rancière, 2003), which is 
never fully complete. 
Moreover, to be able to legitimate collective political 
decisions and to grant rights to other members of socie-
ty, a certain degree of solidarity and a certain sense of 
“living together” (“vivre ensemble”) are required (see 
Kymlicka, 2001). Firstly, this is because in order for the 
rights-holder to have his or her rights respected, not only 
is there a need for formal police and judiciary measures, 
but first and foremost there should be an internalization 
and acceptance of these rights, which we recognize and 
grant one another. Secondly, in order for the collective 
decisions of a political majority to be accepted as legiti-
mate by the political minority, not only should there be a 
formal acceptance of these decisions but also the feeling 
of belonging to a “we” and the knowledge that this 
political minority can become a political majority in the 
near future and decide otherwise (cf. Toqueville, 1961, p. 
212; this is missing in the European context: Weiler, 
1998, and in civic education: Meyer-Heidemann, 2015). 
This model of citizenship in its liberal and democratic 
dimensions has developed at the state level. To what 
extent can one already speak—not only programmatic-
cally, but also de facto—of other dimensions of citizen-
ship at a European and/or global stage? Does the liberal 
dimension of the rights-holder exist on its own? Or does 
the democratic dimension of the political co-actor also 
exist? What if the two dimensions are dissociated? Who 
then decides what rights rights-holders should possess 
and how they should be interpreted if there are no 
democratic co-actors at the European and/or global 
stage? Can a solely liberal dimension lead to a non-
democratic liberal citizenship?  
 
3 The supranational and global citizen: solely as a 
(liberal) rights-holder or also as a (democratic) political 
co-actor?  
3.1 EU citizens: historically only as a rights-holder and 
then as subsidiary, partial political co-actors 
The European Union offers citizenship status to national 
citizens of Member States (Art. 9 to 12, TEU). The EU 
citizen holds rights and can, under certain restrictions, 
act collectively (indirectly through political represent-
tation, directly through legally recognized petition 
initiatives and, of course, through transnational political 
movements related to European issues). The liberal 
dimension of the rights-holder was significantly develop-
ed first, thanks to international treaties, directives and 
regulations, as well as the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) case law (Eis, 2010, p. 166 ff.). This dimension of the 
citizen as a rights-holder is much more developed at a 
European Level than in the political co-actor dimension. 
Even social demands are formulated in terms of rights 
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when they reach the European level rather than as a 
political claim (cf. Buckel, 2011), the addressee of the 
demands being more often the Judiciary than Parliament. 
The EC/EU3 was foremost a liberal construction before 
attempting to develop into a democratic Community/ 
Union. 
It is very controversial as to whether or not (or how far) 
one can speak of democracy at all within the political 
system of the EU (see Scharpf, 2014; Grimm, 2015; 
Streeck, 2011). The great democratic hope brought by 
the direct election of the European Parliament (EP) 
(1979) and by the increasing expansion of the co-decision 
procedure, was hardly fulfilled. Union citizens’ represent-
tatives at the EP have no right of legislative initiative, 
only limited co-decision rights in adopting legislation, and 
limited power in the adoption of the budget. Moreover, 
in the EP there is no functioning opposition and majority, 
which would allow for a politicization of the institution, 
but only a permanent "grand coalition". The two major 
political groups (the European People's Party and the 
Party of European Socialists) always make decisions by 
consensus. There is no realistic possibility for promoting 
political alternatives (Watkins, 2014). The EP is therefore 
not a functioning political organ, understood as a poli-
ticized democratic institution. The EP was created from 
above, before a (conflictual) European political society 
even existed. 
If we address the dimension of solidarity and the sense 
of living together, it should be added that Parliamentary 
representation only makes sense if there is a certain level 
of trust and recognition between representatives and the 
represented, to accept decisions as legitimate. According 
to a republican understanding of representation, the 
representatives represent all interests rather than 
sectional interests, which is not the case for the EP. A 
liberal understanding of representation, according to 
which the representatives represent only part of the 
political society, better corresponds with the practice of 
the EP: political societies or different demoi (Nicolaïdis 
cited by Mouffe, 2012, p. 635) are represented. 
Brunkhorst (2008) – in a similar (German) cosmopolitan 
perspective as Habermas or Beck – wishes to overcome 
the national dimension of solidarity and sees potential in 
a post-national and especially European solidarity. These 
authors tend to consider national forms of political 
identification dismissively. Habermas advocates for 
constitutional patriotism as a rational post-national form 
of political society. Yet national political societies are not 
necessarily ethnically exclusive, there could also be non-
essentialist cultural-political constructs on which demo-
cracies are built (Moore, 2001, p. 2; Kymlicka, 1997). 
Europe, however, is (still) very strongly based on national 
and even sub-national forms of identification that 
contain both rational and emotional dimensions (Mouffe, 
2012, p. 634). EU citizenship is to be conceived of as a 
subsidiary to national citizenship – both in its emotional 
and in its rational dimension – rather than as possibly 
overcoming established national political identities. 
However, a European public sphere has emerged 
through the politicization of social protest movements, 
especially since the multiple crises. European issues 
appeared in the transnational public sphere and are now 
politicized in the form of conflicts (cf. Rancière, 1995). 
According to the democratic idea, EU citizenship is 
politically fought for and not only legally (i.e. formally) 
created. Participation rights such as electing represent-
tatives to the EP were a "gift" from above, but only a 
partially fulfilled promise. For, only when citizens 
mobilize to politicize issues at the European level, can a 
democratic citizenship emerge, which is more than solely 
a liberal citizenship. Through joint actions, political 
identity (identities) and possibly also political awareness 
at the European level are emerging and being articu-
lated. The left, but also conservative parties, ally to 
defend another model for Europe. For example, right-
wing parties are defending a Europe understood as a 
cooperation of sovereign nation-states and politicize the 
issue of identity in a more conservative fashion than the 
liberal left. A diverse European political society has 
developed both on the left and also on the right of the 
political spectrum. This politicization could lead to the 
politicization of the EP in the near future, but for the 
time being politicization still shows its influence at a state 
level. 
 
3.2 "European citizens" of the Council of Europe:  
Human rights-holder and precursors of an elitist 
political actor 
If we now look at the (much larger) Europe of the Council 
of Europe, (not the 28 EU countries, but the 47 countries, 
including Russia and Turkey, belonging to the Council of 
Europe), there are rights-holders, specifically human 
rights-holders, whose rights can individually be defended 
in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
The Council of Europe is not only the oldest, first pan-
European Organization, it is also the only supranational 
institution, where citizens are eligible to complain against 
human rights violations or discrimination allegedly carri-
ed out by their own state. Can we speak then of 
European citizens? However, this is only one half of 
citizenship: the European citizen is a (human) rights-
holder, but not a formal political actor. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that some actors act 
politically when they try to enforce a policy objective 
through a judicial procedure in the ECHR. Firstly, the 
lawyers who bring the action before the Court (who are 
often specialized in human rights) pursue a political goal 
in defending their interpretation of rights. In addition, 
the procedure before the ECHR allows collective actors 
such as NGOs to intervene in writing to a case. That way 
they can defend their political position (their inter-
pretation of human rights) in court. However, to describe 
these actions as political actions of co-citizens, is un-
founded. Many tend to consider litigation as a major 
alternative form of civic engagement in defending 
matters of public interest, such as consumer, environ-
mental or anti-discrimination rights (Kavanagh, 2003). 
But here we are dealing with a very limited range of 
political actors who also have very elitist resources (the 
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need for money, legal knowledge etc.), which cannot be 
com-pared with democratic co-actions. 
 
3.3 A very limited global citizenship: a "declarative" 
rights-holder and a few, mostly professional, political 
actors 
A declarative rights-holder that is without legal enforce-
ment has existed since the end of World War I and has 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively expanded, 
especially since the end of World War II. Since the 
euphoric nineties, where a cosmopolitan world seemed 
attainable – the liberal world had "won" and the "end of 
history" (Fukuyama) was postulated – a limited rights-
holder has developed. This was especially prevalent in 
cases of massive violations of human rights, thanks to the 
proliferation of universal jurisdiction and so-called "hu-
manitarian intervention", later renamed “responsibility 
to protect” (R2P). Ad hoc criminal tribunals in cases of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have 
been established under the leadership of the UN. A 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was also 
established to punish crimes against international huma-
nitarian law. All these measures, which create a kind of 
partial global justice, carry opposing trends: a motive of 
solidarity, but also the tendency of liberal paternalism 
and neo-colonialism (see Andreotti, 2006). As the 
practice of the ICC shows, with the exception of one case 
in January 2016, official investigations have only taken 
place against Africans. In February 2017, the 54 heads of 
state of the African Union committed themselves to a 
collective withdrawal from the ICC (Pigeaud, 2017). 
Regarding the second dimension of citizenship, the co-
actor dimension, it is questionable as to whether such a 
thing can be identified at a global level. Of course, many 
professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
create solidarity as transnational collective actors. These 
are made up of a few amateur, but mostly professional, 
activists forming a kind of global civil society. These 
NGOs are active at a global level and lead numerous 
political struggles. They ensure politicization and public 
visibility of, to name only a couple, economic and 
environmental issues. Some NGOs that are active in the 
field of economic and social development have received 
a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social 
Council and also take part in some international 
conferences such as the climate conferences. They play a 
role in the perception, and addressing, of global 
problems and interests. They inform experts and they 
lead lobbying actions. It is highly disputed as to what 
extent professionalized NGOs and a small number of 
political lay activists lead to an increased demo-
cratization of a "global society" (Brunkhorst, 2008) or 
bring democratic legitimacy to global decisions. A citizen 
is a layman and not a professional who gets paid for his 
political fight. "[F]oot-loose NGOs have their safe home 
bases in the liberal nation-states from which they draw 
most of their resources" (Canovan, 2001, p. 211). 
Eurocentric individualist interpretations of human rights 
and a Eurocentric articulation of political struggles bring 
us back to the high risk of liberal paternalism and liberal 
neo-colonialism. 
 
4 Concepts of Citizenship in European and international 
civic Education Documents: local, national, 
transnational or global citizenship? 
In this fourth part of the paper, we will analyze concepts 
of European and global citizenship referring to the 
approaches of Citizenship Education coming from the 
Council of Europe, UNESCO and networks of societal 
actors (like Networking European Citizenship Education, 
NECE). Through selected documents we analyze  the 
concepts of citizenship referred to for educational pur-
poses in different scenarios for the future of the 
European Union (NECE, 2013) (4.1); in programs on 
Citizenship and Human Rights Education of the Council of 
Europe (4.2); and finally in the Global Citizenship 
Education policies from UNESCO (4.3). The choice of 
these documents is intended to show the predominance 
of the (liberal) rights-holder dimension of citizenship 
over a (politic-democratic) co-actor dimension in these 
discourses. These findings should be seen as an illus-
trative starting point that still need to be thoroughly 
confirmed in further investigations (through systematic 
analysis of educational policies, curricula, and in political 
discourse), which cannot be achieved within the scope of 
this article. 
 
4.1 European Union Concepts of Democratic Citizenship 
The “Four scenarios on the Future of Citizenship in 
Europe 2030” (NECE, 2013) illustrates a very good 
example of both the transformation of citizenship con-
cepts by societal and educational actors and the question 
of how far citizens are able (or unable) to influence 
politics at a supranational level. This document is the 
result of an international workshop held in 2013 in The 
Hague, Netherlands. These scenarios have not been 
developed by so-called experts (such as academics or 
politicians), but by societal actors including students, 
associations in Citizenship Education, and other Non-
Governmental-Organizations such as trade unions 
supported by the German Federal Agency for Political 
Education (bpb). 
Although these future scenarios focus on the possible 
consequences of the recent economic and social crises in 
the European Union, participants at NECE-conferences 
are not only EU-citizens, but come from all over Western, 
Eastern and Southern Europe, even from some 
Mediterranean neighbour states including Egypt, 
Morocco and Israel (www.nece.eu). They focus on 
educational policies and programs by the Council of 
Europe (like Education for Democratic Citizenship and 
Human Rights Education, cf. 4.2). 
In these scenarios there are two “key uncertainties” 
and options for a future development of citizenship in 
Europe: a Europe “in which top-down government pre-
vails” or “in which bottom-up forces become dominant”, 
which would mean more democratic influence from 
citizens over politics. The second uncertainty refers to 
different options of a “unified” or a more “diversified” 
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Europe. If we look at the two “bottom-up” scenarios, we 
get an interesting picture of the ambivalent future role of 
societal actors – perhaps not too dissimilar from our 
current situation. 
 
Figure 1: Four scenarios on the Future of Citizenship in 
Europe 2030 (NECE 2013, 5) 
 
In the Scenario “Union of Communities”, we find the 
following description (ib., 8) under the heading: “A world 
in which the ‘Do it Ourselves’ generation takes the 
lead.”: 
 
“it is more important for your job, pension, health or 
education to have a good social network than to belong to 
a country or to the EU. Everyone is a member of multiple 
communities and associations. People avoid working with 
governments as much as they can. […] Participation in civil 
society has become a necessity for most people. There are 
de facto two separate societies. The formal and 
institutional sphere of national and EU governments with 
their focus on economics and finance, and a large informal 
sphere in which many networks of communities operate, 
unified in their multiple and diverse efforts to shape civil 
society for the benefit of its members.” 
 
This scenario already gives us a very good hint as to the 
ambiguous role of active citizenship and the power or 
powerlessness of civil society, here in a liberal sense of a 
“separate society” of social self-organization. In this 
scenario, citizens and civil society are not really sharing 
competencies in the decision-making process of demo-
cratic institutions. It is actually a disturbing scenario, 
where people have lost their confidence in public 
institutions, and even these institutions have lost their 
capability to really solve public problems – except those 
relating to the economy, finance and security. The very 
active role of civil society described here, is mainly based 
on the necessity that citizens are forced to take self-
responsibility for organizing their social life which also 
means that more and more private actors pay for 
economic and social risks instead of a public social 
welfare. 
A slightly more progressive, emancipatory, grass-roots 
oriented political scenario, where citizens make demands 
for more direct democracy is described in the fourth 
scenario: “European Spring”. None-
theless, the authors do not see this 
kind of citizenship as a final solution 
without obstacles. As we have seen 
during the protest movements in 
several Arabic countries since 2011 
(Arab Spring) and also in the course of 
current protest movements in Europe, 
“citizens reclaim their political power 
and democratic rights”. But those 
“bottom-up revolutions” also tend to 
endorse charismatic leaders and popu-
list movements, not only those of the 
left-wing, but especially those with 
right-wing, religious, nationalist or 
xenophobic objectives: “Traditional 
power hegemonies are besieged by all 
sorts of movements that use combi-
nations of liquid democracy and 
charismatic leadership. […] People align (temporarily) on 
issues and choose their political leaders by following 
them on liquid democracy platforms and then voting 
them in and out of office, by ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’ them 
and by very quickly mass-mobilizing around certain 
topics.” (ib., 9). 
 
4.2 Concepts of Citizenship in the educational programs 
of the Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe, besides its human rights’ policies 
and its jurisprudence, focuses extensively on educational 
programs for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights 
Education (cf. www.coe.int/en/web/edc/home). The 
main aim of the Council of Europe is to promote human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as implemented 
by several European Conventions on Human Rights, … the 
Prevention of Torture, … against Racism and Intolerance, 
… on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation, … against Trafficking in Human Beings, … 
for linguistic and minority rights and for social and 
educational rights, as established by the European Social 
Charter (ETS 35/1961) and by the Charter on Education 
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education 
(CM/Rec(2010)7). 
The basic dimensions of active citizenship according to 
the educational citizenship programs of the Council of 
Europe are encompassed within the following two 
approaches: Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) 
and Human Rights Education (HRE), both of which 
received support from UNESCO. In these approaches, the 
Council of Europe has developed different recommend-
dations for curriculum, teaching, and learning materials 
for schools, pre-schools and higher education, as well as 
tools for non-formal education and training sessions for 
volunteers or professionals. 
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Figure 2: Democracy and Human Rights Start with Us – 
Charter for All (http://www.coe.int/en/web/edc) 
 
In the diagram Active Citizenship Composite Indicator 
(Figure 3, cf. Hoskins & Mascherini, 2009, p. 469), there 
are four dimensions of citizenship activities and com-
petencies. These four dimensions try to combine and to 
include different approaches to citizenship and 
democracy theories. 
There is, on the one hand, the traditional way of parti-
cipating in representative institutions, that is member-
ship in political parties, voting turnout, and additionally – 
still within the logic of representative democracy – the 
participation of women and minority groups. On the 
other hand, there are more “unconventional” ways of 
active citizenship such as protest movements and 
taking part in social net-works, e.g. human rights or 
environmental organizations.  
Besides the basis of “Democratic Values”, there is 
also a fourth dimension of “Community Life”, which 
includes all sorts of cultural, social, or even econo-
mical voluntary service and charity work from the 
football club to the volunteer fire brigade, to the 
church and other religious aid associations. 
The “Active Citizenship Composite Indicator” was 
proposed by an international research group (Hoskins 
& Mascherini, 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012), which also 
measured several citizenship competencies, such as 
Citizenship values, Participation attitudes or Cognition 
about democratic institutions. Although we remain 
somewhat skeptical as to whether it makes sense at all to 
measure citizenship competencies, what was really 
interesting in the results of this study was the fact that it 
was not always the established “stable” democracies of, 
say, England, Sweden or Finland who scored highly in 
citizenship values. „The opposite is true for less stable 
and more recent democracies that can be found in 
Southern and Eastern Europe: in these countries young 
people have greater Participatory attitudes and values.” 
(Hoskins et al., 2008, p. 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Active Citizenship Composite 
Indicator (Hoskins& Mascherini, 2009, p. 
469) 
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4.3 Recommendations on Global Citizenship Education 
policies from UNESCO 
Although the Active Citizenship approach focuses  
primarily on Democratic Citizenship Education in single 
states and in (transnational) European societies, these 
dimensions look very similar to the “learning objectives” 
for “Global Citizenship Education” (Figure 4) developed 
by UNESCO (2015a, p. 29), but with the substantial differ-
rence that the UNESCO-approach does not enhance a 
specific dimension of “protest and social change”. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4: Global Citizenship 
Education – Overall 
Guidance (UNESCO 2015a, 
p. 29) 
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The “first pedagogical guidance” of UNESCO on “topics 
and learning objectives” of Global Citizenship Education 
(UNECO 2015, p. 7) was developed by an Expert Advisory 
Group and field tested by teachers and curriculum 
planners in five member states over three continents (ib., 
p. 74). As a competence-oriented curriculum reco-
mmendation, the guidance differentiates a multidimen-
sional concept of Global Citizenship within three cross-
disciplinary domains of learning: Cognitive, socio-
emotional, and behavioural (cf. Fig. 4). As a central “key 
learning outcome” of the socio-emotional domain, the 
guidance repeats its global citizen definition: “Learners 
experience a sense of belonging to a common humanity, 
sharing values and responsibilities, based on human 
rights” (cf. Fig. 4, p. 29, see also p. 14). At first sight, the 
guidance combines both the political analysis of “global 
issues, governance systems and structures” and the 
knowledge of “actions that can be taken individually and 
collectively” (Fig. 4: see “Key Learner Attributes” and 
“Topics”). Nonetheless the intended “actions” tend to be 
reduced to non-politicized “actions” within civil society 
such as “community work” and “civic engagement” and 
do not encompass the action of co-citizens as described 
above that take part in the political elaboration of 
collective choices and values, through the adoption of 
legislation and of rights. 
The concept of citizenship is further differentiated 
between learning objectives and topics and according to 
different groups of learners from “pre-primary & lower 
primary (5-9 years)” up to “upper secondary (15-18+ 
years)” (pp. 31-40). The learning object “introduce[s] the 
concept of citizenship” for young pupils and the connec-
tion between “key local, national and global issues” 
within the “cognitive domain” corresponds to the “socio-
emotional domain” with the objective to “recognize that 
everyone has rights and responsibilities” (p. 31). These 
responsibilities should be further developed through 
upper primary as a behavioral competence to “discuss 
the importance of individual and collective action and 
engage in community work” and at the upper secondary 
level to “develop and apply skills for effective civic 
engagement” (ibid.).  
The guidance also mentions “inequalities and power 
dynamics” (at lower secondary level) and focuses at the 
upper secondary level on “critically assess[ing] the ways 
in which power dynamics affect voice, influence, access 
to resources, decision-making and governance” (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, these topics do not lead to a critical 
reflection on agency nor of the limited power—or even 
powerlessness—of citizens especially at the suprana-
tional and global level. The “behavioural” domain is 
dominated by the social – individual and interpersonal – 
“behaviour” and not the political “action” and power 
struggles of communities. Even at the highest learning 
level, it is about “social justice and ethical responsibility” 
or about “action to challenge discrimination and ine-
quality” or to “propose action for and become agents of 
positive change”, and not about how global inequalities 
are reproduced by everyday economic activities and 
political decisions.   
5 Conclusion: Adding a critical power perspective to the 
optimistic (post-political) Global Citizenship Education  
The recent UNESCO program Global Citizenship 
Education (GCED) shows similar problems to those of 
various former programs of Education for Democratic 
Citizenship (EDC), also promoted by UNESCO, the Council 
of Europe, and the European Union. There is a significant 
number of important topics, skills, and attitudes which 
focus on the personal, social, and ethical dimensions (as 
“domains of learning”, cf. Figure 4) to educate “ethically 
responsible and engaged” citizens who “demonstrate 
personal and social responsibility for a peaceful and 
sustainable world” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 29). 
Yet many open questions still remain as to whether 
these programs have anything to do with political or 
democratic education in the sense of analysing global 
power relations, reasons for global inequalities, failing 
political regulation and the lack of (and often ineffective) 
ways of “political action” and not solely “post-political 
action” on a global scale (cf. Dean et al,. 2009; Harvey, 
2009). 
(1) The concept of GCED is too broad, too inclusive and 
in normative terms, it is far too affirmative and opti-
mistic. The GCED-concept includes every conceivable and 
consensual educational goal (such as peace, tolerance, 
conflict resolution, environmental protection, gender 
equality etc.). However, at the same time it (usually) 
does not focus on the economic and social resources as a 
precondition for political action. Global citizenship 
should first of all enable students to analyze global 
exploitation and power structures, the inequalities of the 
Global South, and the extent to which the Global North 
contributes to this. In addition to this critical analysis, we 
can also search for possible means of empowering 
collective actors (or subordinated groups) to make their 
voice heard, to take part in transnational decision 
making, and to democratize global economic power 
structures (Dean, 2006; Dean et al., 2009; Eis et al., 2014; 
Frankfurt Declaration, 2016). 
(2) GCED overestimates the function and influence—
meaning the power—of education. How far can educa-
tion initiate or foster change in societies and “help build 
peaceful and sustainable societies” (UNESCO 2015b, p. 
2)? Empirically, the social function of education in the 
first place is to stabilize power relations by selecting 
individuals for access to higher education and to privy-
leged positions in the labor market; to stabilize hege-
monic discourses, produce societal consensus and not to 
initiate (counter-hegemonic) social transformation. 
This leads us back to a fundamental question and 
dilemma of Citizenship Education: is it and should it be 
the objective of education to actually solve political 
problems, to change or to develop societies? There may 
be a difference in formal or non-formal education: in 
schools, universities, professional training, or in educa-
tional programs of societal actors. This is of course very 
often the intention of educational policies which shape 
curricula in order to educate socially responsible and 
economically competent young citizens who are capable 
of developing their personal, social, and economic lives 
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in a globalized world (cf. UNESCO, 2015a, b; Engagement 
Global/KMK/BMZ, 2016). But could it realistically be the 
aim of social science education to change society? Could 
there indeed be something like an Education for 
Sustainable Development in a free-market capitalist 
society based on permanent growth and unsustainable 
conditions of production and consumption? To formulate 
unreachable and excessive educational objectives may 
overburden educational practice. With regard to this 
point, we are definitely not arguing that we should only 
teach and learn what we can measure and quantify by 
standardized tests. One could even argue, that some of 
these objectives only “simulate” a cosmopolitan, sustain-
able and/or democratic development. But there is of 
course a substantial difference between encouraging 
students to participate in neoliberal self-governance, 
self-responsibility (e.g. voluntary services) or simulated 
(post-political) procedures – or to educate people in 
critical thinking and show them the limits of political 
regulation and participation (cf. “Soft versus critical 
global citizenship education”, by Andreotti, 2006). 
(3) GCED has – similar to the EDC programs – a 
structural lack of theories of democracy. Furthermore, it 
is lacking suitable analyses of power relations and of 
growing global, as well as societal injustices. Finally, 
perspectives on failing global political regulation and a 
general lack of supranational democracy as well as the 
dimension of democratic co-actors are absent. Criticisms 
of power have always been a key competence within an 
emancipatory understanding of “Political Education”, 
which were revised once more in the Frankfurt Decla-
ration 2015: “autonomous thinking and action are limi-
ted by dependencies and structural social inequalities. 
These relations of power and domination should be 
detected and analysed. […] Which societal problems are 
being debated, which voices are being heard and which 
actors impose their understanding of the common good? 
What are the reasons for social- and self-exclusion of 
groups and individuals from social and political 
participation? Political Education discusses how exclu-
sions are produced and how barriers are created: bet-
ween the private and public sphere, between the social 
and the political, legitimate and illegitimate, experts and 
lay people.” (Eis et al., 2016) Instead, the concept of 
GCED seems to a greater extent to be pure simulation, if 
not a misleading illusion, of current global politics. What 
otherwise should be the meaning of “global” or 
“cosmopolitan citizenship”, if it is not a political citizen-
ship, i.e. power critical with the possibility of acting 
politically?  
(4) With the aspiration of cosmopolitan citizenship 
education – similar to some EU Citizenship Education 
programs – there seems to be a questionable political 
program: the possible further development of political 
and democratic conceptualizations of postnational 
citizenship. This raises questions over to what extent 
(political) education can and should fill the role of 
creating the conscience of a global, cosmopolitan citizen. 
Decoupling the rights-holder from the political co-actor 
raises the problematic issue of their relationship: If the 
supranational and global dimensions of citizenship are 
reduced to the rights-holder component and to a post-
political actor within civil society, then is this cosmo-
politan citizenship necessarily post-democratic? Who can 
lead the political struggle for the adoption of new 
policies, of new rights, or of new interpretation of rights 
and who should decide upon these interpretations? Only 
the double-dimension of rights-holder and the political 
co-action of fellow citizens allows for the possibility of a 
democratic adoption and interpretation of policies and 
rights (cf. Haller, 2012; Maus, 1999). Otherwise political 
cosmopolitism transforms into solely moral cosmopoli-
tism.  
There seem to be only two possible solutions to this 
dilemma if we still cling to the idea of democracy (which 
of course we don’t necessarily have to) and therefore 
want to link the dimensions of the rights-holder and the 
co-actor/co-author once more. The two options are, on 
the one hand striving for a global democracy, or on the 
other hand returning to regional, national, state, or sub-
national forms of political societies as (political and 
economic) decision-making levels. The first solution runs 
the risk that the liberal individualistic values would not 
(demographically) win as the cosmopolitans often ima-
gine. Therefore, from a liberal perspective the striving for 
a non-democratic liberal moralism on the global stage 
may be more desirable than the political risk of the rise 
of democratic anti-liberalism. The second solution 
suggests a kind of "de-globalization" or "re-localization". 
Such movements can be seen everywhere in Europe 
(Scotland, Brexit, Catalonia, right-wing populisms, left-
wing populisms such as PODEMOS…) as a reaction to the 
loss of power of citizens as political co-actors (Moulin-
Doos, 2017). This second solution runs the risk of being 
judged as retrograde, conservative, and even illegitimate 
from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective, and requires a 
kind of revolution in liberal thinking, but if we stick to the 
idea of democracy and not solely of liberal moralism then 
it seems to be the only emancipatory way. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Political Cosmopolitism addresses the needs and interests of 
individuals directly as “cosmopolitan citizens” and not as national or 
state citizens, that is, via their membership to a particular collectivity. 
2 This section builds on the following article: Moulin-Doos (2016): 
Bürger als Mit-Akteur und Rechtssubjekt: europäische und globale 
Bürgerschaft als Orientierung für die politische Bildung? In: Zeitschrift 
für internationale Bildungsforschung und Entwicklungspädagogik (ZEP), 
p. 12-16. 
3 EC/EU stands for the European Community and its successor the 
European Union. 
